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Executive summary 
What is the contribution of development cooperation to the 2030 Agenda, and how can 
accountability for that contribution be ensured? For the policy field of development 
cooperation, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development means fundamental change 
that necessitates adjustments to established principles, in particular “mutual account-
ability”, by which two partners agree to be held responsible for the commitments they 
voluntarily made. The accountability framework for the 2030 Agenda evolves in parallel 
to the changes in the development cooperation policy field, and there are lessons to be 
learned. In order for the High-level Political Forum (HLPF) to emerge as the locus of 
“global accountability”, the entry points, channels and feedback loops for the inputs from 
various stakeholders require further specification. The danger that development 
cooperation stakeholders do not follow through with their commitments, and are not held 
accountable, makes exploring accountability crucial. 
Accountability for what? Clarify the contribution of development cooperation to the 2030 
Agenda 
Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will require a move from 
“billions to trillions”. However, the operationalisation of the 2030 Agenda, with its 230 
indicators, relies heavily on the traditional concept of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). Given the scale of the transformation, ODA itself will not suffice, and 
strengthening the accountability of all contributions and stakeholders will be key. 
Maximising development cooperation would mean focusing on targeting support to 
countries that do not attract other resources (“leave no one behind”), making investment 
attractive in high-risk contexts (“seed funding”; “catalytic support”), and leveraging 
additional resources (“mobilisation”). 
Make existing accountability institutions and processes more results-oriented 
There is ambiguity in the 2030 Agenda as to whether accountability should focus on the 
level of inputs (“means of implementation”) or on the level of results (SDGs). To focus all 
efforts on results, development partners need to demonstrate seriousness about SDG 17.2 
(the “0.7 per cent target”). 
Towards collective and interlinked accountability 
The operational value of mutual accountability has been limited so far, given power 
imbalances, unclear roles and objectives, lack of enforceability and overlapping 
accountability strands. In the 2030 context, a “collective accountability” will also have to 
cover the private sector and other actors. Collective accountability mechanisms cannot 
enforce, but only incentivise, action through peer-pressure, penalising inertia through 
reputational damage, and encouraging dialogue and reciprocal learning. Because global 
accountability mechanisms are weak on responsibility, answerability and enforceability, 
peer accountability should be strengthened at the level of the EU, G20 and others. 
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Clarify development cooperation and other contributions for the 2030 Agenda 
Given the broad scope and universal applicability of the 2030 Agenda, a fundamental 
challenge is to achieve a prioritisation and clear attribution of responsibility to 
stakeholders. The ambiguity about the role of development cooperation for the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda presents a particular challenge for accountability as it 
impedes the attribution of responsibilities. The aid/development effectiveness agenda 
established operational principles for “how” to do business that were prematurely 
abandoned. Recipient countries should advocate more vocally, salvaging the corpus of 
rules and good practices to maintain accountability of development partners’ 
contributions. Members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) group should 
explore options to revise purpose codes and markers in line with the 2030 Agenda, 
focusing in particular on synergies, and an “SDG budget classification” could make efforts 
comparable. 
Strengthen interlinkages between existing frameworks and the 2030 Agenda  
Synergies and complementarities between accountability mechanisms for development 
cooperation and those for the 2030 Agenda remain limited and could be more effectively 
exploited. Established accountability frameworks for development cooperation (GPEDC, 
DCF, DAC etc.) are currently missing stronger linkages to “global accountability” under 
the 2030 Agenda (“horizontal linkages”). There is also a lack of adequate linkages 
between the national, regional and global layers in both the development cooperation 
policy field and the 2030 Agenda (“vertical linkages”). The principle of “subsidiarity” 
might be useful in organising responsibilities between the three levels (global – regional – 
national). Development cooperation stakeholders should reach out and explore options to 
better align their roles and activities with the 2030 accountability framework, including by 
aligning mandates, roles and commitments, sequencing meeting calendars, coordinating 
inputs, and aligning the timing and content of monitoring surveys. 
 
Accountability for development cooperation under the 2030 Agenda 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 3 
1 Introduction 
What is the contribution of development cooperation under the 2030 Agenda, and how can 
stakeholders of development cooperation (DC) be held accountable for that contribution? 
The implementation of the 2030 Agenda calls for transformative change, requiring 
massive contributions from multiple stakeholders – the public and private sectors, civil 
society, foundations. Albeit not sufficient on its own, development cooperation features 
prominently in the Agenda’s implementation. 
Accountability has been described as “the buzzword of modern governance” (Bovens, 
Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014, p. 1). The mega-trend at the root of the growing interest in 
this concept has been the increasing complexity and supra-nationalisation of government, 
which challenges traditional accountability frameworks (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 
2014, p. 16; Goetz & Jenkins, 2005, pp. 16ff.) Recent international agreements, such as 
the Paris Climate Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), have been 
criticised for the weak accountability frameworks meant to facilitate their implementation. 
Stakeholders’ accountability – i.e. their “obligation or willingness to accept responsibility 
or to account for [their] actions” (Merriam-Webster, 2016) – will therefore be crucial if 
commitments made under the 2030 Agenda are to be delivered. 
Implementation of the 2030 Agenda faces plenty of “multitudes”: a multi-sector goal 
framework (growth, environment etc.), in a multi-polar context (Southern providers, 
private sector etc.) on multi-levels (global, regional, national), with multi-stakeholder 
participation (governments, parliamentarians, civil society). The danger that stakeholders 
do not follow-through with their commitments, and are not held accountable for inaction, 
is therefore real and significant. The global accountability architecture around the UN’s 
High-level Political Forum (HLPF) envisioned it as overseeing a “network of follow-up 
and review processes” in relevant policy fields – including in the development cooperation 
policy field, which has its established “mutual accountability” principle by which “two or 
multiple partners agree to be held responsible for the commitments they made to each 
other” (OECD, 2009, p. 1). Therefore, exploring accountability for development 
cooperation as a key contribution towards the 2030 Agenda is of crucial importance. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it will examine the contribution of 
development cooperation to implementing the 2030 Agenda from a conceptual 
perspective. Second, it contributes to the debate by examining how the concept of mutual 
accountability needs to be transformed in the context of the 2030 Agenda. It does so by 
mapping the existing accountability framework and how it links up to the 2030 Agenda. 
The analysis suggests that, faced with the “multitudes” of the 2030 Agenda outlined 
above, a broader notion of mutual accountability is needed. 
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 addresses the issue of 
“accountability for what” by exploring the particular role and contribution of DC in the 
context of the 2030 Agenda. Section 3 then introduces the concept of (mutual) 
accountability, identifying the need for adaptation in the context of the 2030 Agenda. 
Section 4 then presents the mapping of existing accountability mechanisms for DC and 
those evolving for the 2030 Agenda. The final section identifies ways to improve linkages 
and coherence between the two on the basis of a “collective” and “interlinked” 
understanding of accountability for the 2030 Agenda. 
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2 Development cooperation and the 2030 Agenda 
This section will tackle the first part of the twofold question posed at the outset of this 
paper: what contribution is development cooperation expected to make towards the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda? To explore the issue of how to (better) hold 
stakeholders to account for their actions, clarity is needed first and foremost about the 
initial expectations for that contribution (“accountability for what?”). 
The 2030 Agenda is a comprehensive set of goals for human and planetary well-being. 
Implementing such an agenda calls for an intensive global engagement, massive 
contributions, and unprecedented levels of cooperation among national governments, civil 
society, trade unions, and the private sector at various levels – national, regional and 
global. Together, these stakeholders are called upon to form a revitalised “Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Development” (UN-GA, 2015, p. 10). 
In a context of multiple actors with diffuse responsibilities, identifying the particular role 
and contribution of each is therefore crucial. Within the broader objective of analysing 
accountability in the 2030 context, this section serves to re-examine the particular role of 
DC in the context of the SDGs. 
Development cooperation as “constructive ambiguity”? 
The notion of “development cooperation” is at the heart of this paper, thus warranting a 
brief exploration.
1
 The starting point for that exploration is that there does not exist a 
universally recognised understanding, much less a definition, of what constitutes DC.
2
 
This is why it has been characterised as a “complex and often messy policy space” 
(OECD, 2015a, p. 76). For the purpose of this paper, it is understood as a principal policy 
– similar, for example, to agriculture, trade, or human rights. Other options include, inter 
alia, DC as a concept or as practice. 
As a policy field, the roots of DC stretch back to the 1960s, when the OECD established 
its “Development Assistance Committee” (DAC). The DAC was set up to “consult on the 
methods for making national resources available for assisting countries and areas in the 
process of economic development, and for expanding and improving the flow of long-term 
funds and other development assistance to them”. (OECD, 1996, p. 10) It took the DAC 
12 years to finalise a definition of “official development assistance (ODA)”,3 which is a 
telling sign of the difficulties in reaching consensus on the matter (OECD, 2012, p. 29). 
  
                                                 
1  An historical tracing of how the role of development cooperation has changed over time is beyond the 
scope of this paper; Ali and Zeb (2016) provide a good overview.  
2  Even less consensus exists as to the meaning of “development”, a discussion of which is clearly beyond 
the realms of this paper. 
3  Accordingly, ODA is defined as “flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
and to multilateral development institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and 
local governments, or by their executive agencies; [...] administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and [...] concessional in 
character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent. (OECD 2012). 
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At a minimum, a policy field would have to be characterised by: 
 A broad consensus of primary objectives, which could take the form of a positive 
definition, “what it is”, or negative definition,  “what it is not”4  
 A determination of who is involved, i.e. donors and developing countries, however they 
be defined  
 An indication of the underlying “rationale” or “raison d’être” for the policy field 
 Key characteristics as to how DC should be delivered (OECD, 2008). 
While the emergence of the DAC and its ODA definition helped to solidify the emerging 
policy field, certain ambiguities have continued to characterise DC for which Laurence 
Chandy coined the phrase of it being “riddled with myths” (Chandy, 2011). Since the 
1960s, the concept of DC has undergone significant change, and the contemporary notion 
of a more partnership-based approach is in contrast to earlier conceptualisations of 
“foreign aid”, which had a more paternalistic basis. While the “end of ODA” has been 
proclaimed (Severino & Ray, 2009), the core concept of public finance to developing 
countries seems to persevere, at least for the time being. However, there are indications 
that the impetus for change brought about by the creation of the 2030 Agenda will have a 
more fundamental impact, and within the policy field there is a widespread awareness that 
the 2030 Agenda puts seriously into question the future role and contribution of DC. 
On one side of the continuum of options for DC’s future direction is a narrow focus on the 
objective of poverty reduction and on those countries with the highest levels of poverty. 
For example, Strawson (2015, p. 6) argues that while ODA is smaller in scale than many 
other resource flows (foreign direct investment, remittances etc.), it is the unique altruistic 
character of international public resources that requires they be primarily dedicated to that 
purpose. On the other side is the argument that development cooperation should cover much 
broader objectives, in line with the definition of people and planetary wellbeing contained in 
the 2030 Agenda (Alonso, 2012, p. 30ff.; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015, p. 156). 
Judged against the stated minimum attributes of a well-defined policy field, it becomes 
clear that these conditions are not currently met in the case of DC, and it is doubtful 
whether they ever have been. The re-definition of DC as a policy field in the wake of the 
2030 Agenda is therefore clearly “work-in-progress”. Research by Alexandra Rudolph at 
DIE (Rudolph, 2017) shows that development cooperation – understood as ODA, inter-
national or financial cooperation – has been given an explicit role in the implementation of 
around half of the SDGs.
5
 
The re-definition of DC as a policy field is being debated within the context of formative 
institutions such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
(GPEDC) and the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) (Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 
2014). For example, at the GPEDC Steering Committee in July 2016, the European 
Commission tabled for discussion a definition of development cooperation that included 
international policies, international public finance (ODA, other international public 
                                                 
4 The difficulty with this criterion is that the intention of an intervention may not always be clear, and 
there may be differences between proclaimed and actual agenda.  
5 These are: SDG2a, 4c, 6a, 7a, 8a, 10b, 16a and 17 (1-5).  
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finance such as SSC and climate finance, international non-concessional public finance 
such as guarantees and export credits), international private finance (public–private 
partnerships, foreign direct investments etc.), other sources of international finance (civil 
society organisations, philanthropic foundations), and the interaction between 
international and domestic resources and policies. Accordingly, the border was drawn 
when it comes to domestic resources and policies themselves. (GPEDC, 2016b). And the 
Outcome Document of its Second High-level Meeting in Nairobi in December 2016 also 
includes a re-shaped definition of DC (see Box 2 below). Insofar as accountability 
mechanisms are concerned, the key point here is that “cooperation” relies on a more equal 
relationship than the provision and receipt of aid. 
Box 1: Re-definition of development cooperation policy field 
Development cooperation is an activity that aims to:  
- Support national or international development priorities 
- Not be driven by profit  
- Discriminate in favour of developing countries based on 
cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing 
country ownership.  
Its purpose is to:  
- Guarantee universal basic standards of social protection  
- Promote convergence among countries’ standards of living  
- Support the efforts of developing countries to actively 
participate in the provision of international public goods.  
Finally, its main characteristics suggest that DC is:  
- Explicitly intended to support national or international 
development priorities 
- Discriminates in favour of developing countries 
- Based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance 
developing country ownership.  
Various types of development cooperation identified are financial 
(and in-kind) transfers, capacity support and policy change.  
Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-
operation (GPEDC) 
Today, development co-
operation encompasses a broad 
area of international action 
featuring several financial and 
non-financial modalities, 
including: 
- Financial transfers  
- Capacity-building  
- Technology development 
and transfer on voluntary 
and mutually agreed terms 
- Policy change (for 
example, to ensure 
coherence of domestic 
policies and help to 
address global systemic 
issues)  
- Multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. 
Source: Alonso & Glennie (2015) Source: GPEDC (2016c, p. 6) 
Against the background of the ongoing re-definition of the DC policy field, one 
fundamental trade-off seems to be that the broader and more encompassing a definition, 
the more difficult it becomes to measure and operationalise it. This challenge is also quite 
apparent in the means of implementation under the 2030 Agenda. 
To conclude, the understanding of DC among key actors in the policy field seems 
characterised by a high level of “constructive ambiguity” – that is, by a lack of clarity as 
to the principal purposes, principles, providers, recipients and key characteristics. If not 
welcomed, than at the very least this ambiguity seems tolerated by stakeholders, as it 
serves to mask some of the underlying differences and, put more positively, allows various 
stakeholders who otherwise have quite distinct objectives, characteristics and approaches 
to rally under a common umbrella. However, when turning to the role of DC in the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the ambiguity of the definition of DC is an obvious 
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shortcoming that, given the lack of fundamentals and prerequisites, impedes strong 
accountability processes and mechanisms. 
2.1 Development cooperation and the means of implementation 
The 2030 Agenda brings profound change to the policy field of development cooperation. 
As the title suggests, the Agenda is meant to be transformative for people and the planet. 
Fundamentally new is also the concept of universality, which, referring to the Agenda’s 
unprecedented scope and significance, states that it is “accepted by all countries and is 
applicable to all” (UN-GA, 2015, p. 3). Accordingly, the SDGs are “universal goals and 
targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike” (UN-
GA, 2015, p. 3). Finally, the agenda is meant to be integrative in balancing the three 
dimension of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental). Thus, the 
context for the implementation of the SDGs must be seen as fundamentally different when 
compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Critically, the 2030 Agenda relies on a broad conception of what it will take to implement 
the SDGs.
6
 The so-called “means of implementation” (MOI)7 go considerably beyond DC. 
They can be classified under four broad categories: i) resources, including DC; ii) 
capacity; iii) data and information, and iv) governance (see Table 1 for details). 
Notwithstanding, SDG17 places a strong emphasis on DC with three respective targets 
(see Annex 1), the most instances among all dimensions covered. Accordingly, SDG17 
has been described as the “anchor for development cooperation” (Bester, 2015, p. 11). It 
outlines a strengthening of the MOI and a revitalisation of the global partnership, while 
the other SDGs have individual MOIs attached to them. 
As Table 1 suggests, the overall approach to MOIs found in the 2030 Agenda seems 
neither systematic nor to follow an apparent logic; rather, the list of MOIs seems to have 
developed in an iterative process. While the central MOIs are listed under SDG17, there 
are additional ones listed in the declaratory section on “Means of Implementation and the 
Global Partnership”. Moreover, during the negotiation of the SDGs, the argument by 
developing countries that MOIs should be part of each individual goal in addition to 
SDG17 prevailed over the more restrictive approach favoured by developed countries of 
only one “MOI goal” (Elder, Bengtsson, & Akenji, 2016, p. 1). This is a marked departure 
from the previous MDGs, which featured a single MOI goal only (MDG8). When 
comparing MDG8 to SDG17, the latter has become more concrete in some regards – in 
particular when it comes to long-standing aid commitments such as the 0.7 per cent aid 
target – but also much broader in others; with only five categories and six targets under 
MDG7, but 19 targets and 25 related indicators under SDG17 alone. 
  
                                                 
6 Indeed, there is only one direct mention of “Development Cooperation” (SDG1a). 
7 For an historical tracing of the MOI from Agenda 21 to the 2030 Agenda, see Elder, Bengtsson and 
Akenji (2016). 
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Table 1: Four types of means of implementation in the 2030 Agenda
8
 
Source MOI & Global Partnership SDGs 1 – 16 SDG 17 
Resources 
 
Domestic resources (pp 66) -- Finance  
(17.1 – 5) 
Technology Facilitation 
Mechanism (pp 70)  
 Technology  
(17.6 – 8) 
Capacity -- Research and Development 
(3b); Education Facilities 
(4a); Local Community 
Participation (6b) 
Capacity Building 
(17.9) 
Data & 
information 
-- Early Warning & Risk 
Management (3d)  
Data, Monitoring & 
Accountability 
(17.18 – 19) 
Governance International strategies and 
programs of action (pp 63);  
debt sustainability (pp 69) 
Market measures (2c) Trade  
(17.10 – 12) 
Cohesive nationally owned 
sustainable development 
strategies (pp 63); International 
economic environment […] 
monetary and financial systems; 
strengthened & enhanced global 
economic governance (pp 63) 
Tobacco Control 
Framework (3a); Equal 
Rights to Resources and 
Property Ownership (5a); 
Full Implementation of Int. 
Law (14c); Higher 
Education Scholarships 
(4b); Global Strategy for 
Youth Employment (8b)  
Policy & Institutional 
Coherence 
(17.13 – 15) 
Private sector; labor rights and 
environmental and health 
standards (pp 67) 
Multi-stakeholder 
Partnerships 
(17.16 – 17) 
Source: Author, based on UN-GA (2015) and Elder, Bengtsson, & Akenji (2016, p. 3) 
While some additional MOIs are included under SDGs1–16, they are not in line with 
SDG17 and vice versa. This disarray can be explained largely as a result of the difficult 
negotiation process in the Open Working Group (OWG) in which the SDGs were drafted 
in 2014. Because individual elements were heavily negotiated in an intergovernmental 
process, the MOIs mentioned in the Agenda are at various levels of abstraction and 
specificity. 
Finance as an MOI has the closest resemblance to the notion of development cooperation 
outlined in the previous section. Indeed, this particular MOI was a key issue during the 
intergovernmental negotiations within the OWG. 
Traditionally, the view of DC has been that of the OECD’s concept of ODA, and the 
operationalisation of the 2030 Agenda seems to view DC in those terms. SDG indicators 
related to external finance predominantly use conventional concepts and definitions such 
as ODA and Other Official Flows (OOF). For example, of the 30 finance-related 
indicators (out of 230 total indicators), roughly one-third relate to foreign development 
assistance, one-third to domestic resources, with the remainder pertaining to private sector 
                                                 
8 The focus of this table is an enumeration of all elements; repeat mentions were therefore excluded. 
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funds, South–South Cooperation, or pending further clarification (see Annex 1 for details 
on finance-related SDG indicators). 
The link between the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) is somewhat 
counterintuitive. While the two are often used in public debates as stand-ins for “goals” 
and “means” respectively, the 2030 Agenda did not incorporate the AAAA; instead, it 
“supports, complements and helps to contextualise the 2030 Agenda’s MOI targets” (UN-
GA, 2015, p. 28). 
To summarise, this analysis suggests three things: 
 The conception of DC in the 2030 Agenda is characterised by “constructive 
ambiguity”. 
 The means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda encompass resources, capacity, data 
and information, as well as governance. Counter to common perception, the majority of 
SDGs require efforts that fall under the category of governance. 
 However, with regard to the finance-related means of implementation, the concrete 
operationalisation strongly relies on traditional instruments, in particular the OECD’s 
Official Development Assistance. 
Funding the SDGs 
Given the universal coverage and breadth of coverage of the 2030 Agenda, any 
estimations of the financing required to implement the SDGs are inherently challenging 
due to the host of assumptions and, as a result, are “necessarily imprecise” (UN-GA, 
2014). During the negotiation stage of the 2030 Agenda, an international committee of 
experts, with support from across the United Nations systems, provided a first assessment 
of the financing requirements (UN-FFD3, 2015), later expanded upon by Schmidt-Traub 
and Sachs (2015). However, while it is not likely that detailed figures will ever be 
produced with any precision, there are some indications as to the order of magnitude of 
SDG financing requirements (see Figure 1). 
What is clear is that the move from the MDGs to the SDGs will be one from “billions to 
trillions” (OECD, 2016a, p. 5; World Bank, 2015). For example, Chandy and Gertz (2011) 
suggested that a rough estimate of the cost of raising the income of people in extreme 
poverty to USD 1.25/day standard would be around USD 66 billion per year (UN-GA, 
2014). More recently, Schmidt-Traub and Sachs (2015, p. 123) present an overview of 
existing assessments for a number of SDG sectors and concludes, that for a mere subset of 
SDG sectors
9
 and countries
10
, the financing requirements to meet the SDGs might be 
around USD 1.4 trillion annually.  
  
                                                 
9  These are: Health, education, agriculture and food security, access to modern energy, basic water supply 
& adequate infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure, transport infrastructure, ecosystems 
including biodiversity, data for the SDGs and emergency response and humanitarian work.  
10 Low-income and lower middle-income countries 
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Figure 1: Order of magnitude of investment needs from the literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UN System Task Team (2014, p. 11), x-axis in logarithmic scale 
To summarise, estimates for the financing required to implement the 2030 Agenda must 
be viewed with much caution, but even the most conservative estimates suggest that the 
annual financing requirements are in the order of magnitude of a few to several trillions of 
US dollars per year. 
These figures need to be contrasted with traditional ODA flows, which stand at around 
USD 140 billion annually (Tableau, 2016). According to the 2030 Agenda, supplemental 
to official (government) sources, the gap would have to be covered with contributions 
from other public and private sources, foundations and other actors. 
2.2 Transformational development cooperation 
What is the role for DC within the 2030 Agenda? While DC has been called one of the 
key policy areas to implement the 2030 Agenda, looking at the scale of the transformative 
project that is the 2030 Agenda, it is obvious that it will not suffice. In order to mobilise 
the massive resources needed for achieving the SDGs, the attributes of DC, in terms of 
allocation patterns and objectives, but also modes of operation and modalities, are likely to 
be in need of a fundamental makeover to align with the new mission and expanded 
requirements. The 2014 Development Cooperation Report by the OECD outlines five 
principal passageways in which ODA can make a valuable contribution to support the 
2030 Agenda, which can be summarised under three broad roles (OECD, 2014, p. 25): 
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 Targeting: Supporting countries with DC that face challenges attracting other resources 
(“leave no one behind”); 
 Seeding: Making investment attractive in high-risk contexts, including through the 
provision of “seed funding” and other “catalytic support”; 
 Mobilising: Leveraging additional resources through DC, including through the 
provision of support to increase domestic resource mobilisation, as well as promoting 
policy reform. 
Under the Targeting role of DC, the main objective is to provide public resources to 
countries that are falling behind on various measures of development – thus the slogan 
“leave no one behind”.11 According to the World Bank, “There is no substitute for 
concessional resources, especially for the poorest, most fragile or conflict-torn countries” 
(World Bank, 2015). As such, the underlying concept for this role might be rather 
traditional, but research by the Overseas Development Institute shows that there might be 
large benefits resulting from swift action in this regard (Stuart et al., 2016, pp. 9ff.). 
With regard to Seeding, the role of DC would make investments from the private sector 
more attractive in particularly challenging country contexts. In essence, DC would 
function similarly to “start-up” funding aimed at catalysing the transformation to 
sustainable development, whether financial or non-financial in nature (OECD, 2016a, p. 
88). Such “smart ODA” leverages the multi-faceted nature of DC (i.e. financial assistance, 
capacity-building, policy-advice, technology and skills-transfer, partnerships) and is said 
to have multiplier effects once other financial resources are crowded-in (OECD, 2014). 
Another pathway to positive change is said to work via synergetic effects by result from 
bringing together different policy fields. 
Finally, concerning the Mobilising role of DC, in order to realise the SDGs it has been 
suggested that existing DC resources would need to help attract, mobilise and channel 
additional trillions of dollars in investments in order to meet the overall financing needs 
(Schmidt-Traub & Sachs, 2015, p. 12; Rudolph, 2017). Such mobilisation efforts would 
aim to stimulate the allocation of additional resources, including investment guarantees, 
joint public–private (“syndicated”) loans), public–private joint ventures and so forth. 
Providers of DC generally seem to agree that mobilising private and other resources for 
the 2030 Agenda needs to be “at the core of a modernised, reinvented role for ODA 
(OECD, 2016a, p. 10). One of the most important passageways for the mobilisation 
function of DC is blended finance (Development Initiatives, 2016). In addition, such a 
mobilisation role would also extend to countries’ domestic efforts, as well as efforts to 
promote investment-friendly reforms within countries.
12
  
However, the proposed reframing of DC in the context of the 2030 Agenda has also been 
met with significant opposition and criticism. One major concern advocated by civil 
society and others is that public funding to private sector would be largely unregulated and 
would relapse behind accepted principles of development effectiveness (Concord Europe, 
                                                 
11 In the 2030 Agenda, the term is defined both in terms of individual populations (i.e. within countries), as 
well as at the level of countries as a whole (i.e. among countries) (UN-GA, 2015, para. 4)  
12 Klingebiel, Mahn and Negre (Eds.) (2016) discuss the mobilisation of additional actors from a 
“fragmentation” perspective.  
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2016, p. 19ff.). Their request is that it be guided by the same development effectiveness 
principles, in particular ownership and alignment with government priorities. For example, 
a recent assessment of efforts to leverage additional finance for development on the basis 
of aid funding comes to the conclusion that weathered principles, including ownership, 
development results and accountability, are frequently disregarded under “new” 
approaches that seek to increase other funds (Trade Union Development Cooperation 
Network, 2016, p. 4). 
2.3 Means of implementation and of achieving the SDGs 
What is it that DC is to contribute to, in the context of the 2030 Agenda? The section so 
far has analysed the role and contribution of DC with a focus on the input requirements. 
However, this perspective might be too limited in that the ultimate goal for the 
contribution of DC and all other MOI is the realisation and achievement of the SDGs by 
the year 2030. 
In essence, the argument here is that while the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda are conceptually 
and ideationally ground-breaking in their claim to universality and their level of ambition, it 
can be argued that they are also operationally very much grounded in a traditional 
perspective of development cooperation. For instance, the idea of “means of implementa-
tion” is focused conceptually mostly on the “process” instead of the “outcome” or achieve-
ment of development work. Indeed, the two cornerstones of the concept are the input 
requirements (the “means”) as well as the process of programming them (the “implementa-
tion”). The critical role of both policies and finance, which “cannot be treated independently” 
of each other, is also the headline message of the European Report on Development (2015, 
p. 36). One danger is to “oversell” the importance of ODA vis-à-vis the importance of 
development-favourable policy changes, both in partner and recipient countries.  
While the majority of the SDGs are designed to measure achievement of goals, the means 
of implementation indicators in SDG17, as well as in the other SDGs, are meant to 
measure accountability – that is, the extent to which stakeholders are providing certain 
inputs. From that perspective, the SDGs can be characterised as a hybrid framework that 
aims to focus efforts both on results as well as on the means of implementation. This 
observation is in line with that of Elder et al. (2016, pp. 8ff.), who find that there is frequent 
confusion between means and goals in the context of the SDGs. While the rhetoric about the 
SDGs portrays them to be largely about achieving development aspirations, it can therefore 
be said that many of the individual SDGs are characterised more appropriately as 
intermediate means themselves, which contribute to the achievement of the higher goals of 
human or planetary wellbeing (Elder et al., 2016, p. 2). 
From an accountability perspective, the distinction of “means” and “goals” can be said to 
reflect the “attribution vs. contribution” dilemma, which, at the micro-level, describes the 
difficulty of attributing outcomes to an intervention as significantly more difficult than 
showing a contributing effect. Moreover, the fluid intersection between the concepts of 
means and goals within the 2030 Agenda has potential negative implications from an 
accountability perspective as is blurs the benchmark against which to hold stakeholders to 
account. In a traditionally imbalanced power relationship, as is the case for the aid 
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relationship, achieving results is primarily associated with partner countries, whereas the 
provision of inputs is traditionally associated with contributor governments. 
The blurring of means and goals has at times been seen as a turning away by donors from 
their commitments, in particular the 0.7 per cent target of GNI for aid. A similar argument 
holds for fears that a broader accountability framework may diffuse responsibility for 
those decade-old commitments. For example, the OECD’s approach, under the “Results-
based decision-making in DC” work stream, is to focus on the achievement of SDG results 
by recipient countries (OECD, 2016b). However, such an approach de-emphasises 
provider inputs, and their role and contribution in achieving results, and can therefore be 
seen to perpetuate decade-old imbalances of power in the relationship between providers 
and recipients. In the 2030 context, both the achievement of results and the provision of 
inputs will have to be seen as a joint responsibility and, accordingly, accountability will 
have to be rendered on both sides of the equation. 
3 Mutual accountability: transformation of a key concept 
This section explores the concept of mutual accountability and how it needs to be 
transformed in the context of the 2030 Agenda. Given the important contribution and 
evolving role of DC for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, traditional accountability 
tools for DC no longer seem appropriate both in terms of the size of the challenge and the 
required roles and modalities. Established (if not universally accepted) principles that have 
guided the field for decades will need to be adjusted. One particularly pertinent principle 
is “mutual accountability”. Originally meant to describe the relationship between 
developing and donor countries, in its current form it has now become virtually obsolete. 
Going forward, the principle of mutual accountability must be made fit for purpose so as 
not to become mere political rhetoric without practical meaning. 
3.1 Conceptual perspectives on (mutual) accountability 
Various competing and overlapping typologies and conceptualisations of accountability 
exist. Bovens et al. (2014, pp. 4ff.) summarise the minimal conceptual consensus as 
resting on a relational and communicative core, that is, it the relationship between two or 
more parties bound together by one side’s obligation to provide an account to another 
party with a legitimate stake. In general usage, accountability refers to a principal and an 
agent, whereby the principal is in a situation of power to hold the agent to account. For the 
purpose of this paper, accountability can therefore be understood as a mechanism whereby 
an agent has an obligation to provide an account of his behaviour or action (i.e. about 
a particular domain) to an external party (i.e. the principal) in a certain way (i.e. the 
mechanism) due to an obligation to do so (i.e. basis). 
Mutual accountability, as a sub-category of the broader principle, has become increasingly 
popular in recent decades.
13
 The main driver behind the recent popularity has been the 
                                                 
13  Its occurrence in English-language literature has been steadily increasing since the early 1970s 
according to the occurrence of “mutual accountability” on Google books statistics. 
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“aid effectiveness” agenda aimed at strengthening country ownership, donor harmoni-
sation and alignment (de Renzio, 2006, p. 3). According to a basic definition by the 
OECD, mutual accountability is a “process by which two (or multiple) partners agree to be 
held responsible for the commitments that they have voluntarily made to each other” 
(OECD, 2009, p. 1). 
Drawing on a model by Lindberg (2009, p. 8; compare also Bovens et al., 2014, p. 8; 
Ocampo & Gómez-Arteaga, 2014, p. 2, or OECD, 2015a, p. 76), we can identify five 
fundamentals that need to be clear in order for mutual accountability to function. These are: 
 Area subject to accountability (Domain – see Section 2); 
 Clear definition of who is to be held accountable (Agent);  
 Principal to whom to give account (Principal); 
 The basis or right to accountability (Basis); 
 The mechanism(s) through which it functions (Mechanisms). 
Principal–Agent relations: Clarity about who is to be held accountable by whom is a clear 
prerequisite for functional mutual accountability. In the complex reality within the DC 
policy field, agents regularly have several principals, domestic and abroad. Under the 
traditional aid model, the recipient country was the agent being held accountable by the 
donor. Symptomatic of this was a strongly imbalanced power relationship that put donors 
at the helm of the relationship, with aid volumes and modalities being determined by the 
donor’s assessment of the recipient’s performance. Moreover, “feedback loops” from 
beneficiaries, in particular in aid-dependent countries, to decision-making in donor 
countries were non-existent, and feedback loops in partner countries tended to be oriented 
more “vertically” towards partner countries than “horizontally” to domestic constituencies 
and parliaments.
14
 Severino and Ray (2009, p. 25) suggested the term “diverging account-
abilities syndrome” for this state of affairs. 
However, within the aid-effectiveness paradigm that rests on country ownership, the donor 
and recipient country have bound themselves together in a newly conceived relationship 
of mutual accountability, whereby both are simultaneously accountable for achieving 
results, and assess each other’s performance and the achievement of results jointly 
(OECD, 2015b, p. 69). Accordingly, in the complex realm of principal–agent relations in 
the field of DC, mutual accountability is considered part of the vertical accountability 
framework. 
Basis: A second necessary element for mutual accountability is a shared basis for the 
“answerability” of the agent to the principal, and vice versa. Bovens et al. (2014, p. 5) 
suggest that accountability can principally be rendered on the basis of either ownership or 
affected rights and interests. A common basis is needed to ensure compliance with 
commitments, or acceptance of sanctions in the case of lack of progress. Such a basis 
could be enshrined, for example, in a jointly agreed aid policy, joint framework for 
performance monitoring and assessment, or similar. According to an OECD-
                                                 
14  Compare also Owen Barder “What can development policy learn from evolution?”, blog post 
www.owen.org/blog/4018 (last accessed 20 February 2017). 
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commissioned study, there are three core elements that contribute to functioning mutual 
accountability: a) generating a shared agenda, including a shared understanding of how 
and for what DC should be used; b) monitoring and reviewing mutual commitments; and 
c) providing space for dialogue and negotiation (OECD, 2009, p. 2). 
Mechanisms: Finally, the last necessary element relates to the process of enforcing the 
rendering of accountability, which relies on commitments or common goals as the starting 
point for setting the benchmarks against which actors will be held to account. Such clear 
expectations, in turn, build trust and continuity, incentivise compliance and stimulate 
action that ultimately leads to the achievement of goals. Moreover, the recurring follow-up 
process of monitoring, review and evaluation is a cornerstone of learning in the policy 
field (OECD, 2015b, p. 71). 
In essence, there is a continuum of mechanisms, including “soft” ones to incentivise 
compliance, and “hard” ones to sanction failure. These include reputation-based 
mechanisms that rely in particular on peer-pressure; arbitration mechanisms, applicable, 
for example, in the World Trade Organization; market-based mechanisms, including 
competition whereby “bad” donors lose market shares (de Renzio, 2006, p. 6); and, 
finally, regulation and enforcement-based mechanisms. While there is little room for such 
punitive regimes in the field of DC, contrary to common perceptions, soft sanctioning 
mechanisms, including peer reviews, have been found to be rather effective and also more 
appropriate for the co-operative and voluntary nature of development cooperation (Elgin-
Cossart & Chandran, 2016, p. 5; OECD, 2015b, pp. 70-76). 
The majority of these mechanisms are not without preconditions, however. In particular, 
there needs to be information and transparency about actions, as well as answerability and 
enforcement (Hechler & Tostensen, 2012, p. 2). A 2003 OECD publication describes this 
as the necessity to create an “effective donor–partner relationship” (OECD, 2003, p. 5), 
which should rely on transparent information on objectives and operations, multi-year 
programming, common performance indicators, and a common framework for aid co-
operation, full information on aid flows, and partner-government leadership in aid 
coordination. 
Finally, mutual accountability also has a temporal dimension in that such processes can 
take place either during the process of aid operations or at the level of outputs and final 
achievements (i.e. ex-post – compare also discussion in Section 2.5). Scharpf (1999) 
argued that network governance will lead to decisions that enjoy strong “output 
legitimacy”, as their content might be more appropriate, or better accepted, by target 
stakeholders. On the other hand, they might also be less accepted by stakeholders who did 
not participate in the process (i.e. “input/process accountability”). Patil, Vieider and 
Tetlock (2014, p. 69) argue that there is a fundamental distinction in accountability 
frameworks between those who hold others accountable by focusing on their efforts to 
achieve outcomes and those who focus on their effectiveness in actually delivering 
outcomes (with little regard to the process of arriving at those outcomes). The 2030 
Agenda and the role foreseen for DC in its implementation is a hybrid framework in that 
regard, relying on both input (“means of implementation”) and outcome (“SDGs”) 
accountability. 
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3.2 Mutual accountability and the aid effectiveness agenda 
When taking a long-range view of the policy field of aid and development cooperation, the 
concept of mutual accountability is relatively recent – dating from the early 2000s. The 
disruptive changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, which led to a global 
realignment of objectives, instruments and processes of development cooperation, also 
opened the door for a new egalitarian basis for the relationship of donor and recipient 
countries. This undercurrent culminated in the Monterrey Consensus (UN-DESA, 2003), 
which was underpinned by the ideas of mutual responsibility and accountability as part of 
a new partnership to implement the Millennium Development Goals. Interestingly, while 
the term “mutual accountability” was first mentioned in the Rome Declaration (2003), the 
origins have become conceptually linked to the Monterrey Consensus of  2002 (OECD, 
2003, p. 10; UN-GA, 2005, p. 22; Bester, 2015, p. 8). 
Conceptually, the aim of mutual accountability is a rebalancing of the relationship between 
donors and recipients. The reasons behind this rebalancing were, first, a normative ambition 
to change the latent structural imbalance between donors and recipients that had traditionally 
characterised the policy field. A second reason, which for development partners trumped the 
normative ambition, was the objective to make the delivery of DC more effective (Hechler 
& Tostensen, 2012, p. 4). As part of the aid-effectiveness agenda discussions, it became 
increasingly clear that this required a relationship based on mutual respect and a joint 
commitment to achieving results (Steer, Wathne, & Driscoll, 2009, p. 48). 
The aid-effectiveness paradigm was essentially a very “technocratic agenda” (Glennie, 
2011), the conceptual basis of which was developed in the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness, abandoned in 2012 as a result of the Busan High-level Forum (2011). The 
Paris Declaration defined “mutual accountability” as one of its five main principles, 
whereby both donors and partner countries were said to be accountable for development 
results together (OECD, 2005, p. 47ff). The Declaration further specified three important 
criteria for that relationship, namely, participation, transparency and information, and a 
joint assessment of progress against agreed commitments (OECD, 2005, para. 48-50). The 
respective indicator in the monitoring framework of the Paris Declaration was, however, 
limited to measuring the number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of 
progress. The monitoring survey therefore stipulated a much narrower focus of mutual 
accountability than perhaps originally intended (Wood, Kabell, Sagasti, & Muwanga, 
2008, pp. 24ff.). 
In the aftermath of the Paris Declaration, progress on the mutual accountability principle 
was subject to intense monitoring. Apart from the monitoring surveys,
15
 the UN 
Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), since 2009, has also conducted biennial mutual 
accountability surveys
16
 to measure progress in national mutual accountability and 
effective DC. Some countries, such as Rwanda, have also conducted their own mutual 
accountability assessments.
17
 The 2015 DCF survey on mutual accountability identified 
                                                 
15 Monitoring Surveys were conducted in 2006, 2008 and 2011, respectively. 
16 The surveys have been conducted in 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015, respectively. 
17 Called the “Donor Performance Assessment Framework” (DPAF), accessible on the website 
www.devpartners.gov.rw (last accessed 20 February 2017). 
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key issues deemed important by survey participants, namely: “strong multi-stakeholders 
partnerships; a focus on accountability at local, national regional and global levels; data 
information systems and monitoring frameworks; strengthened country results-
frameworks; and national capacities for monitoring and follow-up” (DCF, 2016, p. 4). 
3.3 Mutual accountability in the 2030 context  
A fully developed accountability framework for implementation is absent from the 2030 
Agenda; instead, the term is rather like a cross-cutting theme (compare Janus & Keijzer 
2014). It is specifically mentioned as an instrumental and secondary concept in relation to 
the role of national, government accountability to citizens, as well as in SDG16 (UN-GA, 
2015, para. 45). Most importantly, the 2030 Agenda contains a full section on “follow-up 
and review”, which is UN terminology for accountability (UN-GA, 2015, para. 47). 
According to Bissio (2015), “the A word’ [referring to ‘accountability’] has been dropped 
from all drafts during the negotiations of the agenda as it proved to be too contentious 
with several states arguing it would infringe on their sovereignty. As a result, the term was 
replaced by a vaguer “review mechanism” which became the “agreed language” in UN 
terminology (Bissio, 2015, p. 2). This is in line with the HLPF mandate, which specifies 
that it “follow-up and review progress in the implementation of the sustainable 
development commitments”. The language in the 2030 Agenda can therefore be seen as a 
continuation of that terminology. 
The UN process has established several principles for how to achieve accountability for 
the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In particular, the agreement called for “regular 
reviews” on the “follow-up and implementation” of the commitments and objectives, 
which shall be “voluntary” (and include developing and developed countries as well as 
relevant UN entities), “state-led”, but shall also “provide a platform for partnerships”, 
including for major groups (i.e. civil society, private sector and others), shall “take into 
account the work of the DCF” and shall “follow-up and review progress in the 
implementation of all the outcomes of the major UN conference and summits in the 
economic, social and environmental fields (UN-GA, 2013, p. 8). Accordingly, the political 
climate during the negotiations of the 2030 Agenda was such that there was no room for 
hard enforcement mechanisms.  
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4 Mapping and analysis of accountability for development cooperation 
and the 2030 Agenda 
Accountability is essential to assess progress and achieve results. This should 
happen at the national, regional and global levels. All actors […] should be 
accountable for honouring their commitments. We need an inclusive, robust yet 
flexible accountability framework.  Ban Ki-moon, 16 May 2014 (UN-SG, 2014) 
This section takes stock of the existing accountability mechanisms for development 
cooperation with a view to identifying gaps, challenges and opportunities in relation to the 
evolving accountability mechanisms for the 2030 Agenda. In 2015, the OECD concluded 
that “no other public policy sphere is subject to such a range of accountability efforts” 
than development cooperation (OECD, 2015a, p. 76). Literature suggests that 
accountability is most effective when it is exercised at the appropriate level. In the context 
of DC and the 2030 Agenda, there are the national, regional, and global levels, which will 
be analysed in turn below (UN-GA, 2015, para. 73). 
4.1 National level 
Domestic accountability of governments to their parliaments and citizens is the central 
mechanism at the national level, alongside mechanisms aimed at strengthening mutual 
accountability with development partners (see Figure 2). 
The Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) of the United Nations regularly conducts a 
survey on mutual accountability,
18
 which provides a comprehensive picture of respective 
mechanisms. Accordingly, the main tools and mechanisms are: 
 Development cooperation and national development policies 
 National and sectoral assessment and coordination forums for governments to meet 
with external donors to jointly review progress 
 Development partner forums, where the executive meets with the group of external 
donors to review progress  
 Development cooperation information systems 
 Joint monitoring and country results frameworks of governments and external donors. 
The evidence suggests that, encouragingly, more than 80 per cent of countries are 
undertaking mutual reviews to track progress on commitments to and targets for 
development effectiveness.
19
 Nonetheless, a majority of countries still find it challenging 
to meet the full set of requirements associated with inclusiveness and transparency. Eighty 
per cent of countries have an aid or partnership policy, and several more are in the process 
of drafting one. Yet, as evidence from past monitoring rounds suggests, involving other 
                                                 
18 Previous iterations were conducted in 2009, 2011, 2013/14 and 2015. 
19 A closer look at the sub-sample (42 countries) that participated in both the 2013/14 and the 2015 
monitoring rounds reveals that while the overall share of countries with the necessary four out of five 
criteria has slightly decreased, there has been absolute progress on each criterion. 
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stakeholders in these processes and making the results of these assessments publicly 
available continue to present challenges. Although practices and arrangements to engage 
broader national and non-state stakeholders differ widely, this area remains a challenge, 
even in well-developed accountability frameworks. Many countries have structured 
opportunities for civil society, the private sector and others to engage in the design and 
implementation of mutual assessment reviews. Yet, even in countries with sophisticated 
mutual accountability frameworks, the engagement of broader national stakeholders 
remains limited. Figure 2 contains an overview of progress achieved on those dimensions 
between 2013/14 and 2015. 
Figure 2: Progress on key elements of mutual accountability (2013 and 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD/UNDP (2016) 
The evidence further suggests that mutual accountability mechanisms are relying on 
traditional development assistance concepts such as ODA, whereas partnerships for the 
2030 Agenda increasingly encompass whole-of-government approaches and a much 
broader group of development partners, including the private sector, foundations and civil 
society. Indeed, in practice, participation in mutual accountability remains largely limited 
to recipient governments and traditional OECD-DAC donors (Bester, 2014, p. vi). The 
role of civil society in this regard is complex, and not necessarily well defined under 
existing mutual accountability frameworks. For example, their role might be operational 
(as an implementing agent for recipient governments, donor governments, or others), or 
rather as a “watchdog” in following developments and advocating for other interests 
(compare Bester 2014, p. vi). 
Among the various mutual accountability instruments, “country-results frameworks” that 
exist in most developing countries have been identified as “the only reliable vehicle to 
produce comprehensive […] information linking development cooperation on inputs with 
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results” and thus are an “essential learning tool to track progress and support SDG 
implementation” (DCF, 2015, p. 2). Ahmed and Müller (2014, p. 1) indicate that there is 
no shared understanding as to what constitutes a country results framework, however, and 
many donors continue to use their parallel monitoring frameworks. 
A challenge for mutual accountability at the national level is that the reach of the 
development cooperation dialogue forums continues to shrink. Indeed, there is some 
indication that “general” arrangements for mutual accountability of development 
cooperation have recently been pushed to the background by more popular thematic 
arrangements. Some examples are the accountability frameworks for the water, sanitation 
and hygiene, and the health sectors (IHP, 2012). Indeed, Ahmed and Müller (2014, p. 3) 
suggest that “the most frequent mutual accountability agreements are made at the sector, 
programme and project levels”. Interestingly, there also seems to be a link with regard to 
the particular modality in use, whereby “In general, mutual accountability practices seem 
more elaborate when basket funding or (sector) budget support is the aid modality” 
(Ahmed & Müller, 2014, p. 3). 
When it comes to the 2030 Agenda, accountability at the national level benefits from a 
broad consensus during the negotiation of the Agenda that this level be the cornerstone of 
a multi-level accountability framework. As signatories of the 2030 Agenda, national 
governments are in the driver’s seat for implementation, and they are also the locus for 
strong accountability based on domestic mechanisms between the executive, legislative, 
judicative and broader society, which can ensure favourable accountability conditions. 
With many accountability elements for the 2030 Agenda in the process of being established, 
many countries in the OECD and EU have already established so-called “national voluntary 
review” (NVR) mechanisms,20 which include multi-stakeholder consultations with civil 
society, trade unions, employers’ associations and other stakeholders. Results of NVRs in 22 
countries were presented at the HLPF meeting in July 2016 at the global level (UN-DESA, 
2016). According to Espey, Walęcik and Kühner (2015, p. 12), common to all national 
accountability mechanisms should be three essential functions: coordination, multi-
stakeholder engagement and timely evidence-based reviews. 
Notwithstanding such positive steps, some scholars have pointed out that in some 
countries, parliaments and civil society organisations do not have sufficient policy space 
to hold governments accountable, and therefore national accountability, albeit the 
cornerstone for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, cannot solely rely on that level 
and must be complemented with global mechanisms (Beisheim, 2015, p. 13). Further-
more, depending on national priorities, the respective domestic accountability mechanisms 
will vary considerably, and it is also envisioned that all SDG targets will be adapted to 
national circumstances, which further adds to the complexity and the attribution challenge. 
Whereas the national level is the focus for accountability for the 2030 Agenda, this is not 
the situation in the case of development cooperation accountability, which is anchored 
mostly at the regional and global levels. This misalignment can lead to conflicting priorities. 
Moreover, the linkages between the national and the regional/global levels are relatively 
                                                 
20 For an overview of established practices, see Espey, Walęcik and Kühner (2015), Niestroy (2016) or 
O’Connor et al. (2016). 
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weak. While some national development cooperation policies have begun reflecting aspects 
of the 2030 Agenda, the missing direct link between the 2030 Agenda / SDGs and the 
country results frameworks of partner countries, or the results frameworks of providers, 
remains a major gap in the national accountability frameworks (OECD, 2016b, p. 3). While 
the 2030 Agenda stipulates a move beyond the “mutual” (i.e. donor to recipient) 
relationship, the DCF mutual accountability surveys evidence suggests that most 
instruments continue to be rooted in the Paris Declaration and the aid-effectiveness agenda 
(DCF, 2016). 
4.2 Regional level 
Countries in the same region often face similar challenges, based on comparable 
geographies, macroeconomic structures, cultures and other shared characteristics,
21
 and 
are thus likely to benefit the most from both inter-regional cooperation and mutual learning 
(compare, for example, Janus et al., 2015, p. 14; HLP, 2013, p. 22; Ocampo & Gómez-
Arteaga, 2016, p. 1). Accountability mechanisms for both development cooperation and 
the 2030 Agenda at the regional level are equally based on this logic. 
With respect to the development cooperation policy field, in contrast to the national level, 
the regional level (and to some extent the global level) is a platform for learning through 
the exchanges of good practices and feedback mechanisms on areas to improve. Key, and 
well-established, instruments in this regard are peer-reviews – “two-way mirrors” in the 
terminology of one study (OECD, 2015a, p. 79). One of the longest-standing and well-
functioning examples in this regard is the OECD-DAC peer review (Ashoff, 2013). While 
not directly related to development cooperation, the African Peer-Review Mechanism 
(APRM) is another example. Finally, routine reports on regional support and 
achievements from both public and private and civil society sources, such as the EU’s 
annual “Accountability Report on Financing for Development”, or Concord Europe’s 
annual “Aid Watch Report” are further useful accountability tools that employ both 
learning and peer-pressure “naming and shaming” mechanisms (DG DEVCO, 2016). The 
EU even has a programme for peer-reviews of national sustainable development policies, 
though this is rarely used (Espey et al., 2015, p. 18). 
The utility of peer-reviews as an accountability tool has long been recognised, and the aid 
effectiveness agenda placed significant value on such instruments as well (compare, for 
example, Rome Declaration 2003). Perhaps surprisingly, there is little conceptual clarity 
concerning the role of UN Regional Economic Commissions in this regard so far. 
In contrast to the development cooperation policy field, the accountability for the 2030 
Agenda to date makes little utilisation of the regional level, relying much more heavily on 
the national and global levels. Literature suggests that this is both a gap and an opportunity 
for strengthening. For example, it has been suggested that “all forms of network governance 
generate a favourable climate for “peer accountability” and that regional accountability 
mechanisms can act as “force multipliers” (Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004; Elgin-Cossart 
                                                 
21 Similarly, there are other country groupings, such as the OECD, that have come together on the basis of 
some shared characteristics, and which are subsumed under the “regional level” category. 
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& Chandran, 2016). In particular, the role of the UN Regional Economic Commissions is 
seen as an important force for learning and peer reviews for the implementation of the 2030 
Agenda (Espey et al., 2015; United Nations Regional Commissions, 2014). 
However, to an extent, the further accountability moves from the national level, the more 
trade-offs there are in terms of democratic accountability and citizen responsiveness. For 
example, Papadopoulos (2007, p. 482) argues that there is nearly always some “loss of 
accountability at home”. In fact, this trade-off has been characterised as one of the 
fundamental problems of two- or multi-level accountability (Conzelmann & Smith, 2008). 
Overall then, regional accountability mechanisms can be seen as complementary to 
national and global ones, with their particular role and focus being to encourage mutual 
learning and the exchange of best practices. 
4.3 Global level 
Global level accountability mechanisms in many ways are distinct from national and 
regional ones. The major mechanisms for the policy field of development cooperation are 
the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), its Global Accountability Surveys, Symposia 
and biennial High-level Meetings, as well as the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC). In addition, the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD has a partial global role as a clearinghouse for data on development 
cooperation flows, according to its mandate “to promote development co-operation and 
other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic 
growth, poverty reduction and improvement of living standards in developing countries, 
and to a future in which no country will depend on aid.”22 
Neither the GPEDC nor the DCF have designated institutions at the national level. The 
GPEDC relies instead on the so-called Global Partnership Initiatives (GPIs), including one 
on “Results and Mutual Accountability”, which have very diverse memberships and act at 
various levels, including at the national level. Moreover, GPEDC has in the recent past 
discussed setting up “National GPEDCs”, which mirror the composition and broadened 
participation of the global GPEDC format at national level.
23
 Crucially, most middle‑  or 
high-income countries are yet to identify updated arrangements to make mutual 
accountability processes more relevant in light of their evolving contexts. 
Perhaps surprisingly, both instruments are relatively recent innovations in the 
development cooperation policy field. Both are conceptualised as forums for dialogue and 
mutual learning and the overlapping role and mandates have been a target of much 
criticism and concern (Janus et al., 2014, p. 3). Of the two, the DCF is the “older” one. 
Anchored under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, its mandate 
includes to “clarify and strengthen mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders 
involved in development cooperation, including extending the measurement of the 
                                                 
22 OECD-DAC Webpage, source: www.oecd.org/development/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm 
(last accessed 05 Jan 2017).  
23 Compare material for the 10th Steering Committee Meeting of the GPEDC, July 2016, New York, source: 
http://effectivecooperation.org/event/10th-gpedc-steering-committee-2/ (last accessed 16 January 2017) 
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implementation, effectiveness and results of development assistance” (DCF, 2008, p. 6). 
In retrospect, that expectation seems still un-met (Elgin-Cossart & Chandran, 2016, pp. 
7ff). Similarly, the GPEDC, in the words of Brian Atwood, one of the “founding fathers” 
of the GPEDC, as the former chair of the OECD-DAC, was created with strengthening 
accountability as a central pillar – i.e. as a way “to hold governments’ feet to the fire” 
(Abdel-Malek, 2015, p. iii). The main mechanisms of the GPEDC are its monitoring 
framework as well as the Global Partnership Initiatives, whereas the DCF relies on its 
mutual accountability surveys and the Secretary-General’s reports on Trends and Progress 
in Development Cooperation. One challenge with the GPEDC is that the standards for of 
its key accountability instruments, the monitoring framework, have been set by the 
members of the steering committee, which individually are also stakeholders of the DC 
being held to account. This could be seen to undermine credibility (OECD, 2015b, p. 71). 
In outlining a number of challenges to overcome for the GPEDC, Abdel-Malek (2015) 
also made particular reference to the non-binding nature of the GPEDC (Abdel-Malek, 
2015, p. 321). 
The monitoring framework is the central element of mutual accountability of the GPEDC, 
and the partnership is currently engaged in a debate about modernisation to reflect the 
challenges and objectives of the 2030 Agenda. There has been vocal criticism of the 
monitoring framework, with critics stressing the need to broaden it beyond traditional 
stakeholders and official DC, and to include effectiveness criteria for other GPEDC 
stakeholders as well, including parliamentarians, civil society and others (GPEDC, 2016a).  
Finally, there are also specific accountability frameworks for various sub-sectors and/or 
themes of development cooperation, such as the IHP+ Global Compact for the health 
sector and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. 
Given the duplications among the mandates and instruments for development cooperation 
accountability at the global level, many have, in the past, suggested a consolidation 
(OECD, 2015a; Keijzer & Lundsgaarde, 2016; Janus et al., 2014). For most global 
accountability mechanisms, including the DCF and the GPEDC, providers of DC are the 
main source of information. Moreover, the information provided is generally at the 
aggregate level instead of country-specific, and provider concerns are generally over-
represented. This misbalance is suggestive of challenges in the mutuality of the 
mechanisms and may need to be addressed. 
In terms of objectives, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs constitute the highest-level goals 
and targets for all accountability mechanisms in the policy field of development 
cooperation. The High-level Political Forum (HLPF) is the central organ for 2030 
accountability, with its mandate as an overseer of a “network of follow-up and review 
processes” in the various policy fields.24 According to Espey et al. (2015), to function as 
the main accountability hub at the global level, the HLPF would have to serve five 
functions: i) foster high-level buy-in, political and public support for the SDGs; ii) provide 
a forum for discussions on progress for stakeholders; iii) encourage evidence-based 
                                                 
24 The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the “principal body […] for implementation of the 
internationally agreed development goals agreed at the major UN conferences and summits, including 
the MDGs” (Res 61/16) The HLPF meets under the auspices of the ECOSOC. 
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discussions; iv) provide a forum for taking stock of progress; and v) encourage UN 
coordination and alignment. 
Main forums and mechanisms under the HLPF include: 
 Annual review, in the context of the HLPF, of the “means of implementation”; 
 Annual follow-up in the Financing for Development process; 
 SDG Progress Report; 
 Sustainable Development Report. 
Overall, the channels, entry points, processing and feedback loops for the inputs from 
various stakeholders and policy fields into the HLPF-centred global accountability 
mechanisms will require (much) further specification. Finally, there seems to be a 
disconnect between global and national accountability mechanisms in that the results of 
the former are rarely reflected in the former, and vice-versa (UN-ECOSOC, 2012, p. 20). 
 
  
Figure 3: Mapping of accountability frameworks for development cooperation and the 2030 Agenda 
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5 Towards a new accountability concept for the 2030 Agenda 
The analysis in previous sections suggests that traditional accountability mechanisms no 
longer seem adequate to ensure implementation of the 2030 Agenda and will have to be 
made fit for purpose so as not to become mere political rhetoric without practical meaning. 
In particular, there are two key deficits in the interlinkages between the accountability 
framework for development cooperation and that for the 2030 Agenda in its current form. 
The first is a vertical one, and concerns the lack of adequate linkages between the national, 
regional and global layers in both the development cooperation policy field, and for the 
2030 Agenda. The second one is horizontal, and concerns the lack of an adequate linkage 
between the development cooperation policy field and the mechanisms for accountability 
established for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. 
5.1 Interlinkages 
Within the DC policy field, vertical linkages of accountability processes between 
countries, regions and the global level can be characterised as informal and ad hoc. In 
particular, there is no linear model whereby lower-level accountability results would be 
aggregated and escalated to the next level up. Such a model would be seen as too rigid, 
burdened by long time-lags, and generally unsuitable for a complex policy field such as 
development cooperation. Instead, scholars have advocated more complementary account-
ability frameworks, which, while mutually reinforcing, do not necessarily rely on each 
other, but divide responsibilities according to a non-linear logic on the basis of rotating 
themes and by taking into account national and regional contexts and priorities (Espey et 
al., 2015, p. 20). 
However, under such a scenario, one of the key issues would be how, and on what basis, 
to assign responsibilities to the different levels? To illustrate: if a National Voluntary 
Review identified a need for different or additional means of implementation, what is the 
transmission channel for this request to reach the HLPF? These are some of the 
fundamental challenges that the global community has to come to grips with. In essence, 
there is a need for rebalancing global goals aimed at fostering global collective action, 
such as the 2030 Agenda, and national target-setting that reflects differentiated, country-
specific and country-driven development priorities (Janus & Keijzer, 2014, p. 3). 
With regard to the horizontal linkages between the DC policy field and the 2030 
accountability framework, more efforts will be needed to transform the HLPF as the locus 
of “global accountability” into a true overseer of a “network of follow-up and review 
processes”. In particular, the channels, entry points, processing and feedback loops for the 
inputs from various stakeholders, including the GPEDC and the DCF, as well as policy 
fields will require further specification. Interlinkages could be established taking various 
forms and shapes, including aligning operational and meeting cycles of key platforms such 
as the HLPF, the GPEDC and the DCF, holding more joint or back-to-back meetings, 
synchronising reporting and monitoring schedules, such as the GPEDC monitoring and the 
DCF accountability survey, with the HLPF process, or agreeing on common themes and 
focal areas to be addressed across platforms and actors. 
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In addressing horizontal and vertical interlinkage challenges, a useful approach might be 
to revert back to the concept of “subsidiarity”. Closely linked to “federalism” at the 
national level, subsidiarity refers to the principle of organising responsibilities between the 
three levels (global – regional – national) according to the idea that issues should be dealt 
with at the “most immediate” level consistent with their resolution. Along those lines, 
stakeholders would follow the principle of subsidiarity to ensure that responsibilities 
within the accountability mechanism for development cooperation for the 2030 Agenda 
are as close as possible to the level of the decisions they seek to influence (Elgin-Cossart 
& Chandran, 2016, p. 21). 
5.2 Collective accountability 
In the context of the 2030 Agenda, the OECD suggested that mutual accountability means 
“everyone is accountable to each other” (OECD, 2015a, p. 78). Indeed, the complex 2030 
Agenda stipulates a move beyond the bi-partisan or “mutual” relationship between 
providers and recipients within a development relationship, and towards “collective” 
accountability relations that encompass a broader variety of actors. 
It is a commonplace argument in the collective action literature that large coalitions, seen 
as necessary for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including parliaments, civil 
society, trade unions, private sector associations, vulnerable groups (major groups in the 
UN context), have potentially limited effectiveness. Benner et al. (2004) propagate multi-
sectoral “public policy networks” that cut across traditional sectors and bring together 
various stakeholders from the public, private and society in such a context. Such networks 
would rely on differentiated and issue-specific accountability mechanisms, including 
professional/peer accountability, public reputational accountability, market accountability, 
fiscal and legal accountability. In essence, strengthening accountability at the various 
levels will require a careful design, in line with the subsidiarity principle, that balances 
and matches the various levels and forums with an appropriate accountability mechanism 
(see Figure 4). 
One of the pertinent lessons from past experience with mutual accountability mechanisms 
is that during implementation the focus tends to narrow onto those aspects that have been 
operationalised and are ready to use. For example, whereas the Monterrey Consensus 
covers a variety of funding sources, the follow-up concentrated almost exclusively on the 
concept of ODA for which basic requirements – a clear definition, target (0.7 per cent of 
Gross National Income (GNI) and monitoring system (DAC aid statistics) had already 
been put in place (European Report on Development, 2015, p. 322). 
A fundamental challenge on the way towards a collective ( and interlinked) accountability 
system is therefore that basic systems for funding sources – South–South cooperation, 
private finance etc. – and contributions – by parliamentarians, NGOs, civil society and 
major groups – other than public finance and provider agencies have neither been agreed 
nor established. 
On a positive front, the preconditions for the success of collective accountability are more 
favourable with the 2030 Agenda than with the MDGs. Unlike with the MDGs, the 
determination of which lacked transparency and the involvement of member states, the 
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SDGs were the result of an extensive consultative process, with strong participation by a 
multitude of stakeholders, and General Assembly approval. Arguably, therefore, ownership 
and buy-in can be said to be much more immediate and serious than with the MDGs, 
providing for a context more suitable for collective accountability. Moreover, when states 
have mutual obligations to each other, as is the case with the universal 2030 Agenda, they 
also tend to have a stronger self-interest in reciprocal monitoring, which can open “windows 
of opportunity” for creating an effective accountability mechanism (Beisheim, 2015, p.1).  
Figure 4: Collective and interlinked accountability 
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6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
There is a growing consensus in the accountability literature that the world is in the midst 
of major changes requiring a basic reformulation of how institutions that govern social, 
economic and political relationships are viewed (Dubnick, 2014, p. 34). The accountability 
for development cooperation and the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development are a case in 
point in this regard. 
This paper examined the contribution of development cooperation to the implementation 
of the 2030 Agenda, and how stakeholders of development cooperation can be held 
accountable for that contribution. The paper indicated that development cooperation is 
necessary for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, but not sufficient for the move 
“from billions to trillions”, which can only be achieved when mobilising funding from 
other sources and collaborating with new partners. Traditional accountability tools for 
development cooperation no longer work under these requirements and will have to be 
made fit for purpose so as not to become mere political rhetoric without practical meaning. 
The paper draws four major conclusions and a number of related policy recommendations 
aimed at moving forward towards collective and interlinked accountability. 
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1. Make existing accountability institutions and processes more results-oriented 
In the debates about accountability for development cooperation and the 2030 Agenda, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that accountability is not a goal itself, but rather a means for 
a faster and fuller implementation. It is therefore important to look at the accountability 
framework in its entirety and whether and how it can contribute to that objective. 
Overall, the accountability for development cooperation in the implementation of the 2030 
Agenda can be characterised as a hybrid of both input and process (focused on the means 
of implementation) and an outcome-based framework (focused on the achievement of the 
SDGs). This is in line with broader social science research suggesting that most 
accountability frameworks fall into this category (Patil et al., 2014, p. 69). Research 
further suggests that a focus on outcome accountability, as in the SDGs, can often 
correlate with agent mistrust, or perceptions of opportunism, when not under close 
supervision. As such, it is associated with risk-taking and innovation, but also gaming of 
metrics and benchmarks. Process-focused accountability frameworks, on the other hand, 
are more prone to “standard practice” and “conformity” (compare Patil et al., 2014, p. 
74ff.), which can come at the cost of achieving tangible impacts on the ground. 
Indeed, this paper confirms earlier research in that it finds a tendency of the rhetorically 
charged framework for development cooperation accountability to degenerate into 
“symbolic politics”. While not entirely stringent – some of the SDGs can in fact be 
characterised as “means” rather than “goals”, the 2030 Agenda’s overall shift of focus 
towards accountability for outcomes is welcome in that regard. Yet, more efforts are 
needed to diffuse prevalent concerns that the new commitment framework that is the 2030 
Agenda does not put into question earlier pledges that pre-date the 2030 Agenda. This 
relates, in particular, to the 0.7 per cent commitment, which has been a continued source 
of contention during the post-2015 negotiations, and remains at the heart of efforts to 
strengthen accountability for the 2030 Agenda. 
Policy recommendations: 
 The “outcome accountability” advanced by the SDG framework is welcome, but before 
particular developing country stakeholders can fully embrace it, development partners 
need to come to terms with their decades-old commitment towards 0.7 per cent of GNI 
for ODA, and make swift and bold progress on SDG17.2. Achieving the target would, 
furthermore, disperse fears that the 2030 Agenda overburdens developing countries, 
given its significant broadening of the Agenda. All countries should adopt the SDGs, 
differentiated and adapted to their particular context, into their national development 
goals and strategies so that achievement of those goals can be subject to relatively 
strong domestic accountability mechanisms via parliaments, citizen action and civil 
society. 
 The United Nations should develop an international “SDG budget classification” and a 
mapping methodology for existing classifications as a basis for governments to link 
their national budget allocations to the SDGs.
25
 Such a move would have several 
advantages: provide for a harmonised approach instead of various stand-alone 
                                                 
25 This idea was first advance in a blog post by Suren Poghosyan on the “Public Financial Management” 
blog, IMF, 17 Aug 2016.  
Timo Mahn Jones 
30 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
classifications; improve the monitoring of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda; and 
allow for easier cross-country comparisons.  
2. Narrow “mutual accountability” is outdated, and a transformation to “collective and 
interlinked accountability” is needed 
The paper further concludes that the operational value of the mutual accountability principle 
has been limited so far.
26
 Accountability has largely been operationalised in traditional terms 
and categories such as donor–recipient, ODA, and so forth. Challenges continue to exist in 
particular with regard to power imbalances, unclear roles and objectives, lack of 
enforceability, limited participation, and multiple, overlapping and disjointed accountability 
strands. In the context of the 2030 Agenda, the principle remains tied to the traditional 
conception of donor and recipient, which no longer seems appropriate. 
In its place, it will be necessary to arrive at a broader conception of “collective 
accountability” by expanding it to the private sector and other actors. This is particularly 
important when development cooperation will be increasingly used to catalyse private 
sector investment (compare Section 2). One of the factors that works in favour of 
collective accountability is the sharing of risk and “mutual pain” (de Renzio, 2006, p. 4), 
given that consequences of inaction and/or lack of effort in achieving the 2030 Agenda 
will affect virtually all stakeholders, albeit not all will be affected equally. 
Given the diversity and complexity of stakeholders, the findings also suggest that 
accountability for development cooperation in implementing the 2030 Agenda cannot be 
adequately brought about by formal frameworks and rules. Instead, and even more so than 
in the past, the global community will have to rely upon soft-power mechanisms, which 
incentivise action, penalise inertia on the basis of reputational damage, and encourage peer 
dialogue and learning. In essence, collective accountability will have to be, and be 
perceived to be, a tool for positive motivation instead of conditionality and enforcement. 
The findings finally suggest that throughout the accountability processes so far there has 
been a low level of involvement of the core “principal” – in other words, “we the peoples” 
in the United Nations Charter – as opposed to the executive and development cooperation 
administrative stakeholders. More receptiveness to the views and inputs of parliamentarians 
and civil society stakeholders should therefore be encouraged. 
The chains of delegation in the current multi-level accountability framework for the 
contribution of development cooperation to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda are 
long. Going forward, the major challenge will therefore be how to broaden the 
accountability framework without an excessive diffusion of responsibilities. All too often, 
diffuse accountability means diluted responsibility of certain actors – the problem of “many 
hands”. 
Policy recommendations: 
 When implementing the 2030 Agenda, stakeholders of development cooperation should 
advocate for a broadening of participation towards collective accountability mechanisms 
                                                 
26 This finding is in line with earlier findings, for example by Hechler and Tostensen (2012, p. 12). 
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that incentivise action through peer-pressure, penalise inertia by reputational damage, and 
encourage dialogue and reciprocal learning. Guiding principles should be a focus on 
results, transparency of all actions, and subsidiarity in implementation mechanisms.  
 Stakeholders of development cooperation should strengthen efforts for a “data 
revolution” to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, and increase the 
transparency of their actions through initiatives such as the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI). Other stakeholders need to agree similar initiatives and 
standards for their contributions, building on existing initiatives. In essence, there is a 
need for an ODA and a DAC equivalent for private sector contributions, NGOs, 
foundations, and South–South cooperation. 
 Because of the weaknesses of existing global accountability mechanisms in terms of 
responsibility, answerability and enforceability, strong mechanisms are needed at the 
regional and national level. Development partners should take further steps to strengthen 
peer accountability of development cooperation at the regional level, including in the EU 
and the G-20. To interface those accountability mechanisms, UN member states will need 
to make some changes at the HLPF and open up the Voluntary National Review (VNR) 
mechanism to regional and other groupings. 
3. Clarify development cooperation and other contributions for the 2030 Agenda 
Given the broad scope and universal applicability of the 2030 Agenda, a fundamental 
challenge for the future will be to achieve a sort of prioritisation and clear attribution of 
responsibility to stakeholders. The danger is that, given that the Agenda in principle leaves 
the door open for every actor to do everything including “business as usual”, there is a 
danger that some of the traditional debates – fragmentation, aid effectiveness etc. – will 
return to the forefront during the implementation phase of the 2030 Agenda, if not 
carefully guarded against. 
The ambiguity about the role of development cooperation for the implementation of the 
2030 Agenda presents a particular challenge for accountability, as it impedes the 
attribution of responsibilities. Development cooperation has to be increasingly oriented 
towards the interlinked, synergetic 2030 Agenda, which gives rise to further 
complications, as individual contributions of various stakeholders will be less visible, thus 
enabling “free rider” behaviour. At the same time, with the aid-development effectiveness 
series of high-level forums, the policy field has undergone a long and costly process of 
establishing principles for “how” to do business that was prematurely diluted in a futile 
attempt to broaden that agenda to other stakeholders. 
Policy recommendations: 
 Recipient countries should advocate more vocally for salvaging the corpus of rules and 
good practices under the aid-effectiveness agenda as a practical and working tool that 
can be used to maintain accountability of development partners’ contributions.  
 DAC members should explore options for a revision of the OECD-DAC purpose codes 
and markers, or for introducing new ones, in line with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. 
In order to acknowledge the synergies, interlinkages and comprehensive nature of the 
2030 Agenda, markers could track means of implementation that are cross-sectoral in 
nature, to map, for example, the water–land–energy nexus, or others. 
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4. Align accountability frameworks for development cooperation and 2030 Agenda 
The HLPF has been tasked to “oversee [..] a network of follow-up and review processes of 
the 2030 Agenda at the global level (UN-GA, 2016). The development cooperation policy 
field has a major contribution to make in this regard. However, this paper found that the 
current accountability framework could be strengthened to ensure implementation of the 
2030 Agenda. Whereas the HLPF formally takes into account the work of the DCF, the 
contribution and role of the GPEDC with respect to the 2030 Agenda remains largely self-
mandated. The paper suggests that synergies and complementarities between the 
accountability mechanisms for development cooperation and those for the 2030 Agenda 
remain limited and could be exploited much more. 
Policy recommendations: 
Stakeholders of development cooperation, including from the GPEDC and the DCF, 
should reach out and explore options for better aligning their roles and activities with the 
2030 accountability framework. Options include aligning mandates, roles and 
commitments, sequencing meeting calendars, coordinating inputs, and aligning the timing 
and content of monitoring surveys (to monitor the means of implementation under SDG17 
and other indicators and/or to provide a complementary perspective to that of the DCF). 
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Annex 1: Classification of finance-related SDG indicators 
SDG Ind.  Operationalization 
1 1a1 Proportion of resources allocated by the government directly to 
poverty reduction programmes 
Domestic 
1a2 Proportion of total government spending on essential services 
(education, health and social protection) 
Domestic 
1b1 Proportion of government recurrent and capital spending to sectors 
that disproportionately benefit women, the poor and vulnerable 
groups 
Domestic 
2 2a1 The agriculture orientation index for government expenditures 
 
Domestic 
2a2 Total official flows (official development assistance plus other 
official flows) to the agriculture sector 
Foreign Aid 
3 3b2 Total net official development assistance to medical research and 
basic health sectors 
Foreign Aid 
4 4b1 Volume of official development assistance flows for scholarships 
by sector and type of study 
Foreign Aid 
5 5c1 Proportion of countries with systems to track and make public 
allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment 
Domestic Resources 
6 6a1 Amount of water- and sanitation-related official development 
assistance that is part of a government-coordinated spending plan 
Foreign Aid 
7 7a1 Mobilized amount of United States dollars per year starting in 2020 
accountable towards the $100 billion commitment 
Open source 
7b1 Investments in energy efficiency as a percentage of GDP and the 
amount of foreign direct investment in financial transfer for 
infrastructure and technology to sustainable development services 
Private Sector 
8 8a1 Aid for Trade commitments and disbursements Open source 
8b1 Total government spending in social protection and employment 
programmes as a proportion of the national budgets and GDP 
Domestic Resources 
9 9a1 Total official international support (official development assistance 
plus other official flows) to infrastructure 
Foreign Aid 
10 10b1 Total resource flows for development, by recipient and donor 
countries and type of flow (e.g. official development assistance, 
foreign direct investment and other flows) 
Foreign Aid 
11 11c1 Proportion of financial support to the least developed countries that 
is allocated to the construction and retrofitting of sustainable, 
resilient and resource-efficient buildings utilizing local materials 
Open source 
12 12a1 Amount of support to developing countries on research and 
development for sustainable consumption and production and 
environmentally sound technologies 
Open source 
13 13a1 Mobilized amount of United States dollars per year starting in 2020 
accountable towards the $100 billion commitment (repeates 7a1) 
Open source 
13b1 Number of least developed countries and small island developing 
States that are receiving specialized support, and amount of support, 
including finance, technology and capacity-building, for 
mechanisms for raising capacities for effective climate change-
related planning and management, including focusing on women, 
youth and local and marginalized communities 
Open source 
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14 14a1 Proportion of total research budget allocated to research in the field 
of marine technology 
Domestic Resources 
15 15a1 Official development assistance and public expenditure on 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems 
Foreign Aid/ 
Domestic Resources 
 15b1 Official development assistance and public expenditure on 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystems 
(repeats 15a1) 
Foreign Aid/ 
Domestic Resources 
17 17.1.1 Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP, by source Domestic Resources 
17.1.2 Proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes Domestic Resources 
17.2.1 Net official development assistance, total and to least developed 
countries, as a proportion of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee donors’ gross national income (GNI) 
Foreign Aid 
17.3.1 Foreign direct investments (FDI), official development assistance 
and South-South Cooperation as a proportion of total domestic 
budget 
Private Sector/ 
Foreign Aid /  
South-South 
17.7.1 Total amount of approved funding for developing countries to 
promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies 
Open source 
17.9.1 Dollar value of financial and technical assistance (including through 
North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation) committed to 
developing countries 
Foreign Aid/ 
South-South  
17.17.1 Amount of United States dollars committed to public-private and 
civil society partnerships 
Open source 
17.19.1 Dollar value of all resources made available to strengthen statistical 
capacity in developing countries 
Open source 
Source: IAEG-SDGs, 2016 
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